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AN ASPECT OF
ESTATE PLANNING IN COLORADO:
THE REVOCABLE INTER VIVos TRUST
BY WILLIAM S. HUFF*
Professor Huff discusses the nature, creation, and validity of
the revocable inter vivos trust, together with the problems that may
arise upon creation and its use as an estate planning device.
INTRODUCTION
T HE trust is exclusively the creature of equity.1 Because of its sep-
aration of legal and equitable title,2 it provides an unique3
method of property disposition4 which is both broad and flexible.'
Its use in modern times in diverse contexts' is living proof of its util-
ity. This Article will treat a particular type of trust, the revocable
inter vivos trust, used as an estate planning device.
If the owner of property does not dispose of it during his life-
time by gift or otherwise, he may by will, provide for its dispositiona
at his death or, he may allow the law to dispose of it for him by op-
eration of the statute of intestate succession.7
The obvious drawback of the owner's making outright gifts dur-
ing his lifetime is that he parts with possession, control and enjoy-
ment of his property. The man of modest means cannot seriously
*Member Arkansas Bar; Member Colorado Bar; BS.L., LL.B., University of Arkansas,
1957; Rhodes Scholar, 1957, Oxford University; LL.M., Harvard University, 1962;
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law.
'Melville v. Weybrew, 106 Colo. 121, 124, 103 P.2d 7, 9 (1940) (jurisdiction over
trusts is always within the domain of a court of equity) ; Bowes v. Cannon, 50 Colo.
262, 266, 116 Pac. 336, 338 (1911) (a true trust is enforceable solely in equity).
2 Botkin v. Pyle, 91 Colo. 221, 14 P.2d 187 (1932) ; Bowes v. Cannon, 50 Colo. 262,
116 Pac. 336 (1911) ; Cree v. Lewis, 49 Colo. 186, 112 Pac. 326 (1910) ; 1 SCOTT,
TRUSTS § 2.3 (2d ed. 1956).
3 The trust is known only to the common law system, though there are analogous ar-
rangements in other legal systems. 1 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 2 (1965) ; 1
SCOTT, TRUSTS § 1.9 (2d ed. 1956).
4Because the law of contracts is as broad and flexible, Professor Scott points out that
the trust would not be unique were it not for the fact that the trust is a means of
disposing of property. 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 1 (2d ed. 1956).
5
MAITLAND, EQUITY 23 (1936); 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 1 (2d ed. 1956).
6 The historical and most common use of the trust is making family settlements. How-
ever, in modern times the trust is used in many business contexts, such as holding
title to real estate in situations in which it would be difficult to divide the legal
title, 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 1 (2d ed. 1956), and pooling of voting rights to stock,
COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-4-17 (1963). For a comprehensive discussion of trusts used
in business contexts, see Isaacs, Tru~ieeshi P in odern Busincss, 42 H4Dv. L .EV.
1048 (1929).
7
COLo. REV. STAT. § 153-2-1 (1963).
REVOCABLE TRUST
consider inter vivos giving and the man of greater wealth will not
consider it as his principal estate planning device.8
The use of a will, though historically the most commonly used
device for estate planning,' has inherent drawbacks. By statute
in every state, a will must comply with certain formalities."0 If
these absolute requirements are not met in the carefully prescribed
manner,1 ample opportunity is provided for attack upon the will by
disgruntled heirs of the testator. 2 If the will is successfully attacked,
it fails as a dispositive instrument. The property attempted to be
passed under the will devolves according to the laws of intestacy, 3
thereby frustrating the testator's intent and substituting therefor a
rather stereotyped, and often inadequate," estate plan created by
operation of law." In addition to the invitation to attack latent in the
strict requirements of the statute of wills, there is another rather im-
portant drawback to the use of a will. The property devised or be-
queathed must go through the process of probate,16 with its attendant
costs."
Caught between the extreme choice of outright gifts and the
rather undesirable attributes of testamentary disposition (or intes-
tacy), an arrangement is needed which would allow the owner to re-
tain control and enjoyment of his property during his lifetime while
at the same time allowing him to make provision for its passing to
his selected recipients after his death. If a disposition is deemed tes-
tamentary, the statute of wills must be followed." "A testamentary
8 This is not to say that under certain circumstances, with specific property and for
appropriate reasons, some inter vivos gifts will not be a useful and appropriate part
of an estate plan, but only that such gifts could not serve as the estate plan. For a
discussion of non-trust gifts, see CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING, Ch. VI (3d ed. 1961).
9SHATTUCK & FARR, AN ESTATE PLANNER'S HANDBOOK § 13 (2d ed. 1953).
10 ATKINSON, WILLS § 62 '(2d ed. 1953). In Colorado a will must be: (1) in writing;
(2) signed by the testator; (3) signed in the presence of two or more credible wit-
nesses; (4) declared by the testator to be his last will and testament; and (5) at-
tested by the witnesses by subscribing their names to the document at the testator's
request and in the testator's presence and in the presence of each other. COLO. REV.
STAT. § 153-5-2 (1963).
"In re McGary's Estate, 127 Colo. 495, 258 P.2d 770 (1953) ; Ireland v. Jacobs, 114
Colo. 168, 163 P.2d 203 (1945) ; International Trust Co. v. Anthony, 45 Colo. 474,
101 Pac. 781 (1909) ; ATKINSON, WILLS § 62 (2d ed. 1953) ("[N]o will is valid
unless there is compliance with all of the statutory requirements.") ; see Deering,
Some Problems Relating to Testamentary Witnesses, 23 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 458
,(1951).
12 Meyer, Non-Tax Advantages of the Revocable Trust, 37 DICTA 333, 335 (1960).
13 In re McGary's Estate, 127 Colo. 495, 506, 258 P.2d 770, 775 (1953) ; cf. Colorado
v. Rogers, 140 Colo. 205, 344 P.2d 1073 (1959) (lapsed legacy) ; Gibson v. Hills,
84 Colo. 596, 272 Pac. 660 (1928) (lapsed legacy).
'4 CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 10 (3d ed. 1961).
15 COLO. REV. STAT. § 153-2-1 (1963) (intestate succession).
18 ATKINSON, WILLS § 96 (2d ed. 1953).
'7 Meyer, Non-Tax Advantages of the Revocable Trust, 37 DICTA 333, 336 (1960).
IgUrbancich v. Jersin, 123 Colo. 88, 92, 226 P.2d 316, 319 (1950); Johnson v.
Hilliard, 113 Colo. 548, 554, 160 P.2d 386, 389 (1945); Smith v. Simmons, 99
Colo. 227, 230, 61 P.2d 589, 590 (1936).
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disposition is one which is to take effect upon the death of the person
making it and as to which he has substantially entire control until his
death, that is, a disposition which is ambulatory."' 9 Therefore, the
solution must be an arrangement in which the transfer does not take
effect upon death in a technical sense, but which does, nevertheless,
take effect on his death in a very practical sense. If this can be accom-
plished, a will may be dispensed with, while retaining the advantages
of a testamentary-like disposition.
There are a number of arrangements, varied in scope and design,
which are deemed to have a present effect, and thus not testamentary,
but which suffice to send the property to another only upon the own-
er's death. The owner of property might, for example, transfer pres-
ently a future interest therein to another, reserving a life estate."
One might acquire property, holding it in joint tenancy with an-
other, or transfer presently owned property into joint tenancy, so that
upon death the property automatically becomes the sole property of
the surviving joint tenant.2 One might create a tentative trust, or
so-called Totten trust, of funds in a savings account by denominating
himself trustee of the funds for another. By this means the depositor
reserves the right to use or consume the money in the account during
his lifetime, but at his death the remaining funds become the prop-
erty of the designated beneficiary.22 A life insurance contract has
certain testamentary characteristics in that the owner may retain con-
trol, possession and the beneficial interest in the policy during his
lifetime. Yet it creates a valid transfer of property upon his death
without compliance with the statute of wills. The courts have had
little difficulty with life insurance, consistently holding it nontesta-
mentary in nature, either on a contract 2 or trust 24 theory. A gift
19 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 53, at 361 (2d ed. 1956).
20Million v. Botefur, 90 Colo. 343, 9 P.2d 284 (1932); ATKINSON, WILLS § 43, at
186 (2d ed. 1953) ("It is agreed that a deed in usual form except for the fact that
it reserves a life estate to the grantor is a valid conveyance and not testamentary.") ;
see Trautman v. Kranz, 63 Colo. 297, 165 Pac. 764 (1917) (transfer of a life estate,
with a contingent remainder also in the transferee did not convert deed into at-
tempted will).
21 COLO. REV. STAT. § 118-2-1 (1963) (joint tenancy valid, but the common law pre-
sumption that a joint tenancy is created unless otherwise indicated, is reversed).
22 Matter of Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904) ; 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS §§ 58-58.6
(2d ed. 1956). No cases in Colorado dealing with the tentative trust were found.
2 Olinger Mutual Benefit Ass'n v. Christy, 139 Colo. 425, 342 P.2d 1000 (1959) ; In
re Hamilton's Estate, 113 Colo. 141, 154 P.2d 1008 (1945); Martin v. Modern
Woodmen, 253 Ill. 400, 97 N.E. 693 (1912) ; Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Rainey,
353 Mo. 477, 182 S.W-2d 624 (1944) ; Johnston v. Scott, 76 Misc. 641. 137 N.Y.S.
243 (1912) ; Hooker v. Sugg, 102 N.C. 115, 8 S.E. 919 (1889) ; Toulouse v. New
York Life Ins, Co., 40 Wash. 2d 538, 245 P.2d 205 (1952); ATKINSON, WILLS §
39 (2d ed. 1953).
2 4
VANCE, INSURANCE § 107 (3d ed. 1951).
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causa mortis is a variant of a transfer effective at death which is not
deemed testamentary.2
5
All the above, however, are limited either in scope of planning
available or in the nature of the property with which they deal. 6
None affords a comprehensive arrangement by which the owner
might establish an effective plan for the disposition of his property.
Even the use of several of the devices would not provide an overall
estate plan. Herein lies the great utility of the revocable inter vivos
trust. Any type of transferable interest that might be dealt with in a
will may be treated in a revocable inter vivos trust.7 The limitations
on planning are only the skill, imagination and ingenuity of the
drafter of the trust.
The nature of the trust with which this Article will be con-
cerned is one created during the lifetime of the settlor and made for
the purpose of avoiding the necessity of a will to the extent of the
property involved; wherein the settlor retains a beneficial life inter-
est, with power to revoke, modify or amend the trust and with control
over the trustees in the administration of the trust, with disposition
to others upon the settlor's death. The object of analysis will be to
determine if such an arrangement is valid, and if so, whether it can
provide a satisfactory substitute for a will, without the disadvantages
of a will.
In modern times revocable living trusts have not been free from
attack and scrutiny in all of their aspects. In fact, there has been al-
most ceaseless litigation concerning their validity. However, in all
courts, no trust has been held invalid because of the reserved power
to revoke, 8 and in a majority of courts such trusts have been declared
valid even where more extensive powers are reserved to the settlor
I. VALIDITY OF THE REVOCABLE INTER Vivos TRUST
A. Generally
Without doubt the revocable inter vivos trust which is designed
to continue after the settlor's death has some testamentary aspects."
25 Brind v. International Trust Co., 66 Colo. 60, 179 Pac. 148 (1919) recognizes gifts
causa mortis but demands strict compliance with common law requisites of having
made the gift in contemplation of death; death from the peril feared; and delivery
with intent that title vest only in the event of death.
26 See 24 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 365 (1952) for a discussion of these and other disposi-
tions, nontestamentary, but effective at death.
27 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 74.1 (2d ed. 1956) (whatever can be given away or passed by
will can be placed in trust).
28 Id. § 57.1.
29 Id. § 57.2.
30 It is interesting to note that one of the principal purposes for the development of
uses, from which our modern doctrine of trusts grew, was to evade the rule of law,
before the enactment of the Statute of Wills in 1540, that land could not be devised.
So, an owner would make a feoffment to another to the owner's use. He could then
devise the use. SCOTT, CASES ON TRUSTS 220, 321 (4th ed. 1951).
1966
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
Such trusts often appear to pass interests to the beneficiaries only at
the settlor's death. The settlor's retention of many incidents of own-
ership, through a retained beneficial life estate, the power to revoke
and amend, and control over the administration of the trust, makes
the disposition seem of a testamentary genre. These aspects have
caused some courts to look with suspicion upon them."'
There would be no question of validity if the trust were drafted
and executed in accordance with the statute of wills. It would be
valid as a will."2 But since it would be a will it will not provide a
solution because it would have all of the previously discussed disad-
vantages, including sending the property held in trust through pro-
bate."
The courts have had no difficulty with the validity of the irre-
vocable inter vivos trust. The irrevocable trust at its creation indefeas-
ibly vests in the beneficiary an interest. Thus, the irrevocable trust is
effective upon creation and not upon the death of the settlor3 4 This
is true even if the settlor reserves a beneficial life interest, because
the beneficiaries still have indefeasibly vested present interests with
only possession and enjoyment postponed.3"
The problem then is to determine whether the beneficiary un-
der the trust receives a present interest at the time of the creation of
the trust. If so, the transfer is not testamentary. If the benefici-
ary receives no interest until the settlor's death, the disposition is
testamentary and invalid unless there is compliance with the statute
of wills.3 6
The beneficiaries may fail to acquire any interest in the trust
property during the settlor's lifetime, either because the conveyance
is ineffective to transfer title to the trustee,3 7 in which case neither
the trustee nor the beneficiary acquire an interest; or, because, though
the conveyance is effective to vest title in the trustee, the settlor
made no disposition of the beneficial interest before his death. 8
In determining whether the trustee acquires legal title during
the settlor's lifetime, the rules applicable to effective conveyances
generally are controlling. Whether a transfer to the trustee is effec-
"1Union Trust Co. v. Hawkins, 121 Ohio St. 159, 167 N.E. 389 (1929) ; Worthing-
ton v. Redkey, 86 Ohio St. 128, 99 N.E. 211 '(1912).
32 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 56.7 (2d ed. 1956).
3 3
ATKINsoN, WILLS § 42 (2d ed. 1953). For this reason, it is wise to avoid an at-
testation clause, since the court might seize on this to construe the trust as a will.
34
Fonda v. Miller, 411 111. 74, 103 N.E.2d 98 (1952); RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
TRUSTS § 56 (1957) ; 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 56.5 (2d ed. 1956).
3 5 Williams v. Evans, 154 Ill. 98, 39 N.E. 698 (1895) ; Hines v. Louisville Trust Co.,
254 S.W.2d 73 (Ky. 1953) ; In re Curry, 390 Pa. 105, 134 A.2d 497 '(1957).
36 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 56 (2d ed. 1956).
3
7 Smith v. Simmons, 99 Colo. 227, 230, 61 P.2d 589, 590 (1936) (to create a valid
express trust it is necessary to do all things essential to pass legal title to the trustee).
38 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 56.1 (2d ed. 1956).
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tive to convey a present interest depends upon the intention of the
grantor,39 as manifested by the instrument of conveyance or the cir-
cumstances attending its execution and delivery."'
If the owner of land executes a deed which purports to convey
the land to another, but manifests an intention that no interest vest
in the grantee prior to the grantor's death, the conveyance is incom-
plete." Thus, the conveyance of land is ineffective where there is no
delivery of the deed. 2 If the grantee is a trustee for a third person,
no trust arises. 3 If the deed provides that it shall have no effect until
the grantor's death, it is testamentary, even though it was executed
and delivered during the grantor's lifetime." The result is the same
where the deed is absolute on its face but is delivered pursuant to an
agreement with the grantee that it shall not be effective until the
death of the grantor.
The same principle is applicable to personal property. If the
conveyance to the grantee is incomplete for lack of delivery, or be-
cause the grantor does not intend it to be effective until his death,4"
the grantee takes nothing. If the conveyance were upon trust, no
trust arises."
On the other hand, the disposition is not testamentary if the
donor surrenders all control, even though the legal title to the prop-
erty does not pass until his death. Thus, a valid conveyance may be
made by the irrevocable delivery of the property or deed to a third
person in escrow, the property or deed to be delivered to the grantee
on the death of the grantor.
39 Johnson v. Hilliard, 113 Colo. 548, 554, 160 P.2d 386, 389 (1945); Dunham v.
Armitage, 97 Colo. 216, 219, 48 P.2d 797, 798 (1935) ; Barnes v. Spangler, 93 Colo.
254, 257-58, 25 P.2d 732, 733 (1933) ; Larison v. Taylor, 83 Colo. 430, 443, 266
Pac. 217, 222 (1928); Taylor v. Taylor, 79 Colo. 487, 489, 247 Pac. 174, 175
(1926) ; Phelps v. Phelps, 71 Colo. 343, 345, 206 Pac. 787, 788 '(1922) ; Taylor v.
Wilder, 63 Colo. 282, 284, 165 Pac. 766, 767 (1917).
40 However, it has been stated that the court will attempt to construe the instrument
valid if possible. Million v. Botefur, 90 Colo. 343, 345, 9 P.2d 284 (1932) ; Clark
v. Bouler's Estate, 62 Colo. 465, 468, 163 Pac. 965, 966 (1917).
41 1 ScOTT, TRUSTS § 56.1 (2d ed. 1956).
42Griffith v. Sands, 84 Colo. 456, 271 Pac. 191 (1928); Larison v. Taylor, 83 Colo.
430, 266 Pac. 217 (1928) ; Childers v. Baird, 59 Colo. 382, 148 Pac. 854 (1915).
43 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 56.1 (2d ed. 1956).
44 Dunham v. Armitage, 97 Colo. 216, 48 P.2d 797 (1935) ; Taylor v. Wilder, 63 Colo.
282, 165 Pac. 766 (1917).
45 Barnes v. Spangler, 93 Colo. 254, 25 P.2d 732 (1933).
46Smith v. Simmons, 99 Colo. 227, 61 P.2d 589 (1936); Clarke v. Commerce State &
Savings Bank, 68 Colo. 401, 189 Pac. 842 (1920). For a discussion of valid inter
vivos gifts in trust of funds in a joint bank account, see Comment, 33 RoCKY MT.
L. REv. 246 (1961); Comment, 24 RocKY MT. L. REv. 133 (1952).
47 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 56.1 (2d ed. 1956).
481d. at 424-25.
49 Kauffman v. Kauffman, 130 Colo. 583, 589, 278 P.2d 179, 182 (1954) (where
deed delivered in escrow was without qualifications, exceptions or reservations, it
constituted an absolute conveyance in praesenti) ; Thuet v. Thuet, 128 Colo. 54, 260
P.2d 604 (1953). But see, Barnes v. Spangler, 93 Colo. 254, 25 P.2d 732 (1933).
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Assuming a valid present transfer is made to a trustee during
the settlor's lifetime, the trust is invalid if the trust deed indicated
that the beneficiaries were to receive no interest until the death of
the settlor.'0 However, it would not affect the validity of the trust
if the beneficiaries' rights to possession and enjoyment were post-
poned until the grantor's death as long as they received a presently
vested future interest upon the creation of the trust."'
Assuming effective conveyance of the property to the trustee
and present vesting of future interests in the beneficiaries, various
aspects of such a trust must be considered which might lead to the
conclusion that it is testamentary in nature.
It is well settled today that the power to revoke an inter vivos
trust does not render the trust testamentary."2 This view is sup-
ported by the theory that the beneficiary receives a vested interest
upon creation of the trust. The death of the settlor is not a condi-
tion precedent to the vesting of the interest, though the interest re-
ceived is subject to being divested by subsequent revocation of the
trust by the settlor during his lifetime.
Some cases have suggested that the intent of the settlor to evade
compliance with the statute of wills by the use of a revocable trust
might affect its validity. 3 It is difficult to see how such an intent,
even if expressed in the trust instrument, could affect its validity.
Any inter vivos transfer necessarily has the effect of obviating the
need for a will with respect to the property transferred. A person is
presumed to intend the obvious consequences of his acts ;54 thus, lit-
erally applying this concept, any inter vivos transfer would be invalid
because it must of necessity be intended to evade the statute of wills.
Rather, the statute applies, in the interest of preventing frauds, only
to regulate the formalities of those dispositions which are in fact
50 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 56 '(2d ed. 1956).
5 1 Hignett v. Sherman, 75 Colo. 64, 75, 224 Pac. 411, 415 (1924) (an estate is vested
when there is an immediate right of present enjoyment, or a present fixed right of
future enjoyment, quoting from 4 KENT, COMMENTARIES (14th ed.)); Taylor v.
Wilder, 63 Colo. 282, 286, 165 Pac. 766, 768 (1917) (it is unnecessary that the
deed pass an immediate interest in possession, but it must be effective to pass the
interest or estate at execution) ; cases cited note 38 supra.
52 Miles v. Miles, 78 Kan. 382, 96 Pac. 481 (1908) ; National Shawmut Bank v. Joy,
315 Mass. 457, 53 N.E.2d 113 (1944) ; Ridge v. Bright, 244 N.C. 345, 93 S.E.2d
607 (1956). Only one case expressed the view that the mere power of revocation
would have made the trust invalid (had it not been for a local statute), Union Trust
Co. v. Hawkins, 121 Ohio St. 159, 167 N.E. 389 (1929), and this language was
later repudiated in Cleveland Trust Co. v. White, 134 Ohio St. 1, 15 N.E.2d 627
(1938).
53Jones v. Old Colony Trust Co., 251 Mass. 309, 146 N.E. 716 (1925); McEvoy v.
Boston Five Cents Savings Bank, 201 Mass. 50, 87 N.E. 465 (1909) ; National New-
a & Essex Bank Co. v. Rosahl, 97 N.J. Eq. 74, 128 At. 586 (19 o9 The first
and last cases upheld the trusts, finding no intent to evade the statute of wills; the
trust fell in McEvoy, but this case was severely criticized and overruled in National
Shawmut Bank v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457, 478, 53 N.E.2d 113, 126 (1944).
54
Ellis v. Jones, 73 Colo. 516, 517, 216 Pac. 257, 258 (1923).
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testamentary. Either the disposition is testamentary in nature, in
which event compliance with the statute of wills is mandatory; or,
it is not and the statute of wills need not be followed. It is imma-
terial that the settlor's motive in creating the trust was to avoid the
necessity of complying with the statute of wills. As Mr. Justice
Holmes said:
We do not speak of evasion, because, when the law draws a line, a
case is on one side of it or the other, and if on the safe side is none
the worse legally that a party has availed himself to the full of what
the law permits. When an act is condemned as an evasion what is
meant is that it is on the wrong side of the line indicated by the
policy, if not by the mere letter of the law.55
Professor Scott suggests what is really meant when a court speaks of
the importance of the settlor's intent is that the transaction creating
the trust must be real and not merely colorable. " Generally courts
have proceeded on the more logical basis that the intent of the settlor
to use the trust as a substitute for a will, i.e., to evade the statute of
wills, is immaterial to the validity of the trust. 7
Thus, a power of revocation, a reserved life estate in the settlor,
or the intent to avoid the use of a will, will not render an inter vivos
trust testamentary. The remaining area of contention and the prime
problem today is the amount of control which the settlor retains over
the administration of the trust. The question presented by reserved
control is whether it, in fact and law, renders the trustee nothing
more than the mere agent of the settlor. The Restatement of Trusts,
section 57, adopted in 1935, provided:
Where the settlor transfers property in trust and reserves not only
a beneficial life estate and a power to revoke and modify the trust
but also such power to control the trustee as to the details of the
administration of the trust that the trustee is the agent of the set-
tlor, the disposition so far as it is intended to take effect after his
death is testamentary and is invalid unless the requirements of the
statutes relating to the validity of wills are complied with.58
This, of course, made the validity of the trust depend on the extent
of control reserved by the settlor 9 The theory behind this provision
is that the very essence of the principal and agent relationship is that
the agent acts in behalf of and subject to the control of the princi-
55Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625, 630-31 (1916). In Superior Oil Co. v. Missis-
sippi, 280 U.S. 390, 395-96 (1930), Mr. Justice Holmes said: "The fact that it de-
sired to evade the law, as it is called, is immaterial, because the very meaning of a
line in the law is that you intentionally may go as close to it as you can if you do
not pass it."
56 1 ScolT, TRUSTS § 57.1 (2d ed. 1956).
57 National Shawmut Bank v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457, 471, 53 N.E.2d 113, 122 (1944);
Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 376, 9 N.E.2d 966, 967 (1937); Windolph v.
Girard Trust Co., 245 Pa. 349, 366, 91 Atl. 634, 639 (1914).
5 8 
RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 57(2) (1935).
59 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 57.2 (2d ed. 1956).
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pal.6" If the trustee is also the agent of the settlor, the rules of agency
prevail,6' and thus the relationship would terminate on the death of
the settlor (as principal) 62 and would be ineffective insofar as de-
signed to continue after his death."
If the owner simply gave possession of his property to another,
instructing him to deliver it to a third person upon the owner's
death, certainly the holder of the property would be a mere agent
of the owner. No interest would have passed to the third per-
son during the owner's lifetime. The attempted disposition to the
third person upon the owner's death would be testamentary in na-
ture and invalid for failure to comply with the statute of wills."
Professor Scott feels that if a transaction is essentially of this nature,
with the only change being the vesting of legal title in the agent (so
that he also becomes a trustee), the result should be the same."
A number of trusts have been held invalid on the ground of re-
served control by the settlor. " A greater number of cases, however,
have held that reservation of control by the settlor does not render
the trust testamentary.67 The Restatement of Trusts adopted in 1957
took a stronger stand than that of 1935, in favor of the validity of
trusts over which the settlor has reserved control, providing:
Where an interest in the trust property is created in a beneficiary
other than the settlor, the disposition is not testamentary and invalid
for failure to comply with the requirements of the Statute of Wills
merely because the settlor reserves a beneficial life interest or because
he reserves in addition a power to revoke the trust in whole or in
part, and a power to modify the trust, and a power to control the
trustee as to the administration of the trust.
68
Professor Scott favors upholding such trusts, even where extensive
powers of control are reserved to the settlor, stressing the fact that
where the trust is represented by a formal trust instrument the pur-
60 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 2 (1958).
6 1 Id. § 14B.
62 Id. § 120.
63 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 8 (2d ed. 1956).
6
4 ATKrNSON, WILLS § 42 (2d ed. 1953) ; 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 57.2 (2d ed. 1956).
65 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 57.2 (2d ed. 1956).
66 Betker v. Nalley, 140 F.2d 171 (D.C. Cir. 1944) ; Atlantic Bank v. St. Louis Union
Trust Co., 357 Mo. 770, 211 S.W.2d 2 (1948) ; Burns v. Turnbull, 294 N.Y. 889,
62 N.E.2d 785 (1945) ; In re Shapley's Trust, 353 Pa. 499, 46 A.2d 227 (1946).
67 Farkas v. Williams, 5 Ill. 2d 417, 125 N.E.2d 600 (1955) ; Bear v. Millikin Trust
Co., 336 Ill. 366, 168 N.E. 349 (1929) ; Kelly v. Parker, 181 Ill. 49, 54 N.E. 615
(1889) ; Leahy v. Old Colony Trust Co., 326 Mass. 49, 93 N.E.2d 238 (1950) ;
National Shawmut Bank v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457, 53 N.E.2d 113 (1944) ; Rose v.
Rose, 300 Mich. 73, 1 N.W.2d 458 (1942) ; Goodrich v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co.," 270Mich.x 2 .0° N.W. 253 ( ... • e Mason'sEstate, 9 .Pa. 485 0
A.2d 542 (1959) ; Alexander v. Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Co., 4 Utah 2d 90,
287 P.2d 665 (1955) ; In re Estate of Steck, 275 Wis. 290, 81 N.W.2d 729 (1957).
68 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 57 (1957).
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pose behind the statute of wills, to prevent frauds, is not violated. 9
Also, the formal instrument would seem to evidence something more
than a mere casual handing over of property to another for disposi-
tion on the owner's death to a third person.
B. Colorado's Position
The revocable inter vivos trust had an inauspicious beginning
in Colorado. Apparently the first case in which the Colorado court
had occasion to deal with such a trust was Dunham v. Armitage." In
that case property was purportedly conveyed to another as trustee,
with the grantor reserving possession and the right to the rents and
profits from the property for life. The trust was subject to an ex-
press power of revocation. The trust provided that "upon the death"
of the settlor, revocation not having occurred, the property was to
become that of the beneficiary. The court held that the reservation
of the power to revoke and the reservation postponing vesting of title
until the death of the grantor were fatal to the trust because they
demonstrated an intent of the grantor that the trust was not to be
effective for any purpose prior to his death.'
Since 1954 there has been a trilogy of unrelated cases' dealing
with the revocable trust, culminating in a landmark decision in favor
of the validity of the revocable trust."
In the first case of the series, Brown v. International Trust Co.,'
the court dealt with a revocable life insurance trust. The trust com-
pany as beneficiary of the policy was to collect the proceeds of the in-
surance on the settlor's life and hold them as trustee for designated
beneficiaries of a trust agreement. By the trust instrument, the settlor
retained for his life all of the incidents of ownership, including the
right to pledge the policy, the right to borrow on the policy, the
right to receive the dividends and refunds of the policy, and the right
to change the beneficiary of the policy. The settlor also reserved the
right to revoke or amend the trust instrument during his lifetime.
With regard to the power of revocation reserved in the trust instru-
ment, the court quoted from Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers
which said there was a well established rule of law as follows:
The power of revocation is perfectly consistent with the creation of
69 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 57.2 (2d ed. 1956) ; United Building & Loan Ass'n v. Garrett,
64 F. Supp. 460, 465 (D. Ark. 1946). Contra, 1 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
§§ 103-04 (1935).
7097 Colo. 216, 48 P.2d 797 (1935).
71 Id. at 219, 48 P.2d at 798.
7 2 Denver Nat'l Bank v. Von Brecht, 137 Colo. 88, 322 P.2d 667 (1958); Richard v.
James, 133 Colo. 180, 292 P.2d 977 (1956) ; Brown v. International Trust Co., 150
Colo. 543, 278 P.2d 581 (1954).
7 Denver Nat'l Bank v. Von Brecht, supra note 72.
74 130 Colo. 543, 278 P.2d 581 (1954).
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a valid trust. Title passes to the donee, and remains vested for the
purpose of the trust, even though there be a right to revoke it. The
power to revoke is not evidence of an intent to postpone the legal
enjoyment, existence, or effect of that which may perhaps be there-
after brought to an end, for the reason that the enjoyment and pos-
session actually passes to the beneficiaries. Until the right to revoke
is exercised, an estate exists by virtue of the transfer.75
While definitely a step in the direction of upholding revocable inter
vivos trusts, this case was somewhat limited in its value as a prece-
dent because it involved an insurance trust upon which the courts
have always looked favorably while holding them nontestamentary in
nature, " and because not all of the factors which had been raised con-
cerning the validity of such trusts were present, particularly, control
over the administration of the trust.
The next case involving the revocable trust was Richard v.
James.' The power to revoke in this case was not express, but was
argued from a construction of the trust instrument. The trust on its
face purported to be irrevocable . The settlor, dying of cancer,
created a trust for the purpose of research into its cause and cure.
The only factor which raised a question as to its not being the
normal irrevocable trust which it purported to be was a provision
in the trust instrument making the trust property subject to the debts
of the settlor at his death. It was contended by the plaintiff in at-
tacking the trust that this provision amounted to a power to revoke,
since the settlor might by incurring debts, in effect, revoke or defeat
the trust. The court did not cite Brown v. International Trust Co.
which apparently would have been dispositive of that objection.
Rather, the court contented itself with examining the evidence and
stating there was no indication the settlor had intended to use the
debt clause to defeat the trust.78 It would seem the court was in-
fluenced in this approach by the fact that the plaintiff was the wife
of the settlor and was attempting to assert her marital rights against
the trust property. The court wanted to make it clear that the trans-
fer was not merely "colorable" as against her. Because of the court's
approach this case added little, if anything, to Colorado's position on
the testamentary aspects of the revocable inter vivos trust.
The final case of the trilogy, and the one providing a landmark
in Colorado in favor of the validity of such trusts, is Denver Nat'l
Bank v. Von Brecht.7" In this case the settlor transferred stock to a
75 Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers, 29 F.2d 14, 17 (2d Cir. 1928).
76Sigal v. Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 119 Conn. 570, 177 Atd. 742 '(1935);
In re Albert Anderson Life Ins. Trust, 67 S.D. 393, 293 N.W. 527 (1940) ; see 46
HARv. L. REv. 818 (1933).
77 133 Colo. 180, 292 P.2d 977 (1956).
78 Id. at 185, 292 P.2d at 979.
79 137 Colo. 88, 322 P.2d 667 (1958). This case was noted in 35 DicrA 146 (1958)
and 30 RocKY MT. L. REv. 517 (1958).
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bank as trustee. The trust provided that the income should be paid
to the settlor for life and that the settlor might have all or part of the
corpus upon written request. Provision was made for the care of the
settlor from the trust property in the event of his illness, and the
trust property was subject to the expenses of the settlor's last illness.
A provision was made for distribution to others after the settlor's
death. The settlor retained the power during his life to add property
to the trust, to revoke, modify or amend the trust agreement, and the
power to pass on any sale or disposition of trust property by the
trustees when the value of the property involved exceeded $1,000.
Despite these extensive powers reserved by the settlor, there
were many powers granted to the truste concerning the management
of the trust property. The lower court, relying on the case of Dunham
v. Armitage," concluded the trust was testamentary in nature and void
because not executed in compliance with the statute of wills. The
lower court felt the trust was intrinsically an agency, since the settlor
retained virtual control and dominion over the trust property.8' The
Colorado Supreme Court distinguished Dunham on the ground that
there, possession had been retained by the settlor, while in the present
case the bank had possession of the stock. While it seems the cases
are distinguishable, possession does not seem the point, but rather
the fact that in Dunham the trust deed provided that the beneficiaries
were to have no interest until the death of the settlor, whereas here
the trust instrument had no such language. 2 In upholding the trust
the Colorado Supreme Court said:
Where as here, the property involved in a trust is assigned, trans-
ferred and set over to the trustee and remains in the name of the
trustee, the interest of the settlor therein passes to the trustee in
presenti and while the settlor remains alive the transfer is inter vivos
and not testamentary. Hence, if an owner of property can dispose of
it inter vivos and thereby render a will unnecessary for accomplish-
ment of his practical purposes, he has a right to do so. The motive
in making such a transfer may be to obtain the practical advantages
of a will without the necessity of making one, but the motive is
immaterial.83
The case was ideal because all of the aspects about which questions
of validity had been raised were presented at one time; it settled
many questions theretofore unanswered for Colorado attorneys and
8097 Colo. 216, 48 P.2d 797 (1935).
81 Denver Nat'l Bank v. Von Brecht, 137 Colo. 88, 93, 322 P.2d 667, 669 (1958).
82 It has also been suggested that the Dunham case can be distinguished not only on
the basis of the reservation postponing the vesting of interests in the beneficiaries
until the death of the settlor in that case, but also on the basis that in the Dunham
case the grantor had no fiduciary duties to perform, whereas in the Von Brecht case
the trustee bank had a great many duties despite the veto power over investments in
the settlor. See 30 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 517, 518 (1958).
3 Denver Nat'l Bank v. Von Brecht, 137 Colo. 88, 99, 322 P.2d 667, 672 (1958).
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their clients. The summary at the close of the court's opinion pro-
vides a concise outline of Colorado's present position:
To recapitulate: The settlor specifically reserved to himself three
matters, viz. (1) The income from the trust estate; (2) the right
to change or entirely revoke the trusts, and (3) the right to dis-
approve investments of more than $1,000 suggested by the trustees.
It is agreed by counsel on both sides that a settlor may reserve a life
income for himself, together with the right to revoke the trust, and
he may reserve additional powers if he does not go too far. We are
satisfied that settlor did not go too far in reserving the so-called
veto power concerning investments proposed by the trustee. Re-
statement of Trusts, § 57 states: 'The intended trust is not testa-
mentary merely because the Settlor reserves power to direct the
trustee as to making of investments or the exercise of other par-
ticular powers, or power to appoint a substitute trustee.' 84 (Em-
phasis added.)
Of course, the case is limited by its facts as to how far the settlor may
go in controlling the trustee, but certainly the breadth of control over
the trustee in the facts of this case would satisfy most settlors. The
court's opinion contains a warning about control in the language "if
he does not go too far."85 It is difficult to theorize where the line
will, or should, be drawn in the permissible amount of control which
the settlor may retain. Surely a distinction cannot be drawn on the
amount or value of property involved. A veto power over every in-
vestment is no more harmful to the nature of the arrangement than
one only on those investments over $1,000, for the trustee would
still, in the first instance, perform his duties of management.
The court's stress of the fact that possession of the trust property
had passed to the trustee" could not be carried out logically as a test
of validity. For example, assume that real estate, used as a home,
were placed in trust; the only manner in which the settlor might re-
tain a beneficial life interest would be by retaining possession of the
property. 7 The Restatement of Trusts, adopted in 1957, would seem
to deem such a trust with retained possession valid.8
Employing a conceptualistic approach, once legal title has passed
from the settlor to the trustee, and the beneficiaries have acquired
vested future interests, the transfer would seem to be inter vivos and
not testamentary. Retention of control by the settlor scarcely increases
the testamentary nature of the transaction beyond what the retained
life estate and the power to revoke accomplish.
Perhaps the most stringent test would arise if the trust agree-
84 1d. at 101-02, 322 P.2d at 674.
85 id. at 102, 322 P.2d at 675.
86 d, at 93, 322 P.2d at 669.
87Williams v. Evans, 154 Il1. 98, 39 N.E. 698 (1895) (trust valid though property
in possession of settlor).
88 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 57, comment b, illustration 2 (1957).
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ment provided that the trustee should have legal title, but that the
possession and power to manage the trust property would remain in
the settlor until his death; that upon his death the trustee would take
possession of the property and manage it for the benefit of the ulti-
mate beneficiaries. This situation is no more objectionable than that
created by the powers which are presently permitted to the settlor. If
land were involved," the statute of uses" might operate to leave a
legal life estate in the settlor because of the passive nature of the
trust during iis lifetime.9 But he would have made a nontestamen-
tary disposition in trust of the remainder interest.
In attempting to find the real import of the transaction, one
may approach the question of validity from a less conceptualistic di-
rection. A consideration of the dichotomy between agent and trus-
tee covers this approach. While the difference between the two
is one of degree,92 it would seem that the theory of the beneficiaries'
having received vested future interests, and Professor Scott's prag-
matic approach of stressing a formal trust instrument93 should be
sufficient to overcome any possible objection to extensive control re-
served by the settlor.
II. PURPOSES FOR WHICH A REVOCABLE TRUST MAY BE CREATED
As a general proposition a trust, like a contract, may be created
for any lawful purpose." The same proposition is, of course, true of
the revocable trust. However, experience has shown there will be
difficulty when the purposes of the trust run contrary to established
public policy. Two areas of persistent difficulty have involved the
rights of creditors and the rights of the settlor's spouse to claim
against the trust property.
A. Creditor's Rights
The settlor may desire to protect the beneficiaries of the trust
from their own indiscretion. To accomplish this purpose he may
make their interest in the trust property subject to a spendthrift pro-
vision - providing that a beneficiary may not voluntarily anticipate
his interest under the trust, and that creditors of the beneficiary shall
not have a right to reach the trust property. The majority of juris-
89 Id. § 70.
90 See O'Reilly v. Balkwill, 133 Colo. 474, 297 P.2d 263 (1956); Ohio and Colorado
Smelting & Refining Co. v. Barr, 58 Colo. 116, 144 Pac. 552 (1914).
91 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 69, comment c (1957) (where the duties of
the trustee may not begin until after the expiration of a limited period, the statute
of uses may execute the trust for the limited period).





dictions, 5 including Colorado,16 recognize the validity of spendthrift
provisions. The theory supporting their validity is that the owner
might not have made the transfer to the beneficiary, and had he not
done so, the creditors would have had no complaint. Thus the owner
may limit his gift in this manner." No particular form of words is
required to create a spendthrift provision," but it is necessary that
the provision be set forth in the instrument in clear and unequivocal
language or that the intention to create the provision appear clearly
from a reading of the entire instrument.99
There is a split of authority, even in states which recognize valid
restraints on the right to income for life, concerning restraints on
alienation of the equitable fee.' This could be of importance in the
typical trust where the settlor retains the income for life, with the
equitable remainder in fee in the beneficiaries. However, in Colorado
if the settlor retained the income after his death payable to the bene-
ficiaries for life or for a term of years, the restraint on the bene-
ficiaries' right to receive income after the settlor's death would be
valid under the authority of Snyder v. O'Conner."
If the interest of the beneficiary is limited to the amount needed
for his support, he may not assign his interest nor may his creditors
reach it, even in the absence of an express restraint on alienation."H
It is held otherwise if the interest is not measured by a standard for
support, but is a fixed amount or the entire income, with an indica-
tion in the trust that the funds are for "support."'' ° If the trust is a
discretionary trust- one in which the beneficiary has no absolute
95 
GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS § 58 (2d ed. 1947) ; 2 Scorr, TRUSTS § 152 (2d
ed. 1956).
9
6Newell v. Tubbs, 103 Colo. 224, 84 P.2d 820 (1938); Snyder v. O'Conner, 102
Colo. 567, 81 P.2d 773 (1938); see Estate of Nicholson, 104 Colo. 561, 569, 93
P.2d 880, 883 (1939).
97
Snyder v. O'Conner, 102 Colo. 567, 570, 81 P.2d 773, 774 (1938) ("The testator
could lawfully have willed his property away from his children entirely, and he had
a right to limit his gift in the way he did.") ; cf. Johnson v. Shriver, 121 Colo. 397,
409, 216 P.2d 653, 659 (1950) (with regard to a power of appointment; "We rec-
ognize the right of a donor of a power of appointment to condition his bounty as he
sees fit, and creditors of the donee of the power have no reason to complain that the
donor did not give his bounty to them.").
98 GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS § 264 (2d ed. 1947) ; 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 152.4
(2d ed. 1956). See Newell v. Tubbs, 103 Colo. 224, 227, 84 P.2d 820, 821 (1938),
where the court said: "Without setting out any formal definition, we may state that
it is only by the use of language similar in meaning and legal import to that con-
tained in the recent case of Snyder v. O'Conner, 102 Colo. 567 [5693, 81 P.2d 773
[774 (1938)] that such a trust may be established ...."
" Newell v. Tubbs, 103 Colo. 224, 84 P.2d 820 (1938); GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT
TRUSTS § 264 (2d ed. 1947) ; 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 152.4 (2d ed. 1956).
100 GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS §§ 84-91 (2d ed. 1947).
101 102 Colo. 567, 81 P.2d 773 (1938).
102 GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS § 430 (2d ed. 1947) ; 2 Scorr, TRUSTS § 154 (2d
ed. 1956).
103 GRISWOLD, Id. § 433; ScoTT, Ibid.
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right to income but is entitled only to so much as the trustee in his
discretion determines to pay - the beneficiary may not assign, nor
may his creditors reach, his interest.104 If the trust does not contain
a spendthrift provision, is not a trust for support, or a discretionary
trust, then the beneficiary may transfer his interest and his creditors
may reach it."
A different question is presented when dealing with the settlor's
creditors. If the settlor has creditors existing at the time of the trans-
fer creating the trust, the creditors may avoid the transfer as a fraudu-
lent conveyance. 0 ' This would be true whether or not the settlor had
reserved a beneficial interest or a power to revoke."°' The remaining
questions assume that there is no fraudulent conveyance, since if
there were a fraudulent conveyance, it would be dispositive of the
issue. If the settlor retains no life interest, but merely the power to
revoke the trust, his creditors may not force him to exercise the power
in order to reach the property which would then return to him. 8
When the settlor does reserve an interest under the trust, the existing
creditors of the settlor are protected by a Colorado statute, beyond
the protection provided by the statute pertaining to fraudulent con-
veyances, which provides:
All deeds of gift, all conveyances and all transfers or assignments,
verbal or written, of goods, chattels, or things in action, or real
property, made in trust for the use of the person making the same,
shall be void, as against the creditors existing of such person. 09
This statute does not cover the position of creditors who became such
subsequent to the transfer creating the trust. However, it is uniform-
ly held, without benefit of statute, that the creditors of the settlor
may reach his reserved interest, although an attempt is made to pro-
tect his interest by a spendthrift provision."0
Where the settlor reserves a beneficial life interest and a power
to revoke the trust, the question arises whether his creditors may
reach his remainder interest as well as his life estate. It might be
argued that since the settlor retains most of the incidents of owner-
ship, he should not be allowed to retain these incidents and at the
104 GRISWOLD, Id. § 425; ScOTT, Id. § 155.
105 GRISWOLD, Id. § 10; ScoTr, Id. § 132; see Newell v. Tubbs, 103 Colo. 224, 84 P.2d
820 (1938) (beneficiary made an assignment of his interest; court found no spend-
thrift provision and allowed the assignment to stand).
106 COLO. REV. STAT. § 59-1-17 (1963) (made with the intent to hinder, delay, or de-
fraud creditors); GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS § 472 (2d ed. 1947).
107 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 330.12 (2d ed. 1956).
1o8 Ibid.
10 COLO. REV. STAT. § 59-1-11 (1963).




same time keep "his" property from his creditors."' However, on
the theory that the remaindermen have a vested future interest, it is
held that the creditors of the settlor may reach only the settlor's life
estate, unless there was a fraudulent conveyance.1
B. Spouse's Rights
The common law rights of dower and curtesy have been abol-
ished by statute in Colorado."' The husband's. 4 property is free of
any vested interest of his wife, and he may dispose of it during his
lifetime without his wife's knowledge"1 or consent."1
Like most states,"' Colorado has an election statute. It provides
that a wife may renounce her husband's will and elect to take the
statutorily prescribed fraction of her husband's "property or estate."'118
If the husband has made an outright and absolute disposition during
his lifetime, then, of course, his wife cannot successfully assert her
rights against the property transferred. What constitutes an effective
conveyance, in the sense that the wife's rights would be foreclosed,
is governed by the same rules of conveyances, whether or not the
transfer was in trust. If the transfer by the husband were ineffective
for want of delivery of the deed or property,' or for an intention
that title was not to pass until his death,' then such property would
still be a part of his probate estate. As such, it would be subject to
the wife's claim.''
Colorado has a number of cases dealing with the wife's rights in
property transferred or purportedly transferred by the husband dur-
ing his lifetime." The cases have not always been consistent. The
1113 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 330.12 (2d ed. 1956).
112 GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS § 475 (2d ed. 1947) ; 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 156 (2d
ed. 1956).
113 COLO. REV. STAT. § 153-2-1(2) (1963).
114 Reference shall be had to the husband's disposing of his property and the rights of
the wife, since this is the normal context of the cases, though the rules announced
would be the same if the positions of the husband and wife were reversed.
115 Wilson v. Lowrie, 77 Colo. 427, 236 Pac. 1004 (1925).
"nThuet v. Thuet, 128 Colo. 54, 260 P.2d 604 (1953) ; Wright v. Nelson, 125 Colo.
217, 242 P.2d 243 (1952) ; Norris v. Bradshaw, 96 Colo. 594, 45 P.2d 638 (1935).
117 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 146A n.1 (2d ed. 1956) ; Phipps, Marital Property Interests, 27
ROCKY MT. L. REv. 180, 191 (1955) (for a listing of provisions in each state).
118 COLO. REV. STAT. § 153-5-4 (1963) (the prescribed share is one-half).
119 Griffith v. Sands, 84 Colo. 456, 271 Pac. 191 '(1928); Larison v. Taylor, 83 Colo.
430, 266 Pac. 217 (1928) ; Childers v. Baird, 59 Colo. 382, 148 Pac. 854 (1915).
120 Smith v. Simmons, 99 Colo. 227, 61 P.2d 589 (1936); Dunham v. Armitage, 97
Colo. 216, 48 P.2d 797 (1935) ; Taylor v. Taylor, 79 Colo. 487, 247 Pac. 174
(1926).
121 Rea, Election to Take the Statutory Share, 29 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 506, 523 n.96
(1957).
122Moedy v. Moedy, 130 Colo. 464, 470-71, 276 P.2d 563, 566 (1954); Bostron v.
Bostron, 128 Colo. 535, 539, 265 P.2d 230, 232 (1953) ; Thuet v. Thuet, 128 Colo.
54, 60-61, 260 P.2d 604, 607 (1953) ; Phillips v. Phillips, 30 Colo. 516, 519-20, 71




following statement has often been quoted with approval by the
Colorado court:
There can be no doubt of the power of a husband to dispose abso-
lutely of his property during his life, independently of the concur-
rence, and exonerated from the claim of his wife, provided the
transaction is not merely colorable, and be unattended with circum-
stances indicative of fraud upon the rights of the wife. If the dis-
position of the husband be bona fide, and no right is reserved to
him, though made to defeat the right of the wife, it will be good
against her.1
3
In Ellis v. Jones the court laid down the proposition that intent to
deprive the wife of her rights was irrelevant, saying:
One cannot give away land without depriving his heirs of it. He is
presumed to intend the consequences of his own acts. He must
therefore be regarded as intending to deprive his heirs of what he
gives away; but all agree that he may give. Is it not, then, evident
that the intent is irrelevant, that if the deed is genuine, it is valid,
but that if it is a mere pretense it is invalid? In other words, if
colorable, it is invalid, otherwise valid.
124
Other courts took this same position.'25 A colorable deed was defined
as one which is "counterfeit, feigned, having the appearance of truth
. ..not really intended as a deed."" This would mean that "fraud"
and "colorable" apply only to those transactions which are not really
what they purport to be, a sham or trick. If so, the only time the
wife would have any claim against the property transferred would
be when the property was still a part of the husband's probate estate.
Her rights would be no greater than the executor or any other party
interested in the estate. The only possible additional protection she
might have would be a subjective one - the tendency of the court to
look more closely at a transaction in which the wife's rights were
involved.
The often quoted statement from Kerr'27 to the effect that the
husband must reserve no interest to himself is also in doubt. In
Thuet v. Thuet'8 the transfer was upheld against the claim of the
surviving husband though the grantor retained a lifetime use, pos-
session and control of the property, transferring the remainder by
irrevocably delivering a deed to a third party, with instructions to de-
liver the deed to the grantee only upon the grantor's death. 2 '
123 KERR, FRAUD AND MISTAKE 220 (1872).
124 Ellis v. Jones, 73 Colo. 516, 517, 216 Pac. 257, 258 (1923).
125 Moedy v. Moedy, 130 Colo. 464, 471, 276 P.2d 563, 566-67 (1954); Norris v.
Bradshaw, 96 Colo. 594, 597, 45 P.2d 638, 639 (1935).
126 Ellis v. Jones, 73 Colo. 516, 517, 216 Pac. 257, 258 (1923).
127 KERR, FRAUD AND MISTAKE 220 (1872).
128 128 Colo. 54, 260 P.2d 604 (1953).
129 See Moedy v. Moedy, 130 Colo. 464, 276 P.2d 563 (1954) ; Million v. Botefur, 90
Colo. 343, 9 P.2d 284 (1932).
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Thus, it would appear today that the wife is not in a position to
assert her statutory rights against a completed transfer, despite the
fact it was made with the intention of defeating her rights, and de-
spite the fact the husband retains possession and control during his
lifetime.
The next question, logically, is what are the wife's rights if the
husband reserves a right to revoke the inter vivos disposition which
he has made. The Thuet case contained a warning, saying it would
have decided otherwise had the grantor retained a power of revoca-
tion. But, the transfer involved was not one in trust. A transfer not
in trust, if revocable, would not be a completed transfer. The prop-
erty would remain in the husband's probate estate, against which
his wife could assert her statutory claim.13 This does not reach the
problem of her rights when the husband has a power of revocation
over a transfer in trust.
While the concept that a revocable deed does not convey any
present interest is true with regard to a transfer of a legal interest by
deed,131 this concept has been deemed inapplicable to transfers in
trust.32 The beneficiary of a trust receives immediately a vested equit-
able interest, even though subject to being divested by revocation.'33
Though the validity of the revocable trust as nontestamentary is
established in Colorado, 3' the question of the rights of the wife in
the trust property remains open. In Richard v. James,'35 the trust was
attacked by the wife claiming her statutory share. The court upheld
the transfer against her claims, though it was in effect subject to a
power of revocation through a clause making the res subject to the
debts of the settlor upon his death. However, the court did not treat
the question of revocability, confining its comments to the fact there
was no indication the husband had intended to use the debt clause to
defeat the trust. The court dealt with the trust as irrevocable (which
it purported to be), and therefore, did not reach the problem of the
wife's rights in property held under revocable transfers in trust.
130 See Shores v. Shores, 134 Colo. 319, 303 P.2d 689 (1956) ; Falbo v. United States
Nat'l Bank, 116 Colo. 508, 181 P.2d 1020 (1947) ; Johnson v. Hilliard, 113 Colo.
548, 160 P.2d 386 (1945) ; Barnes v. Spangler, 93 Colo. 254, 25 P.2d 732 (1933) ;
Hardy v. Carrington, 87 Colo. 461, 288 Pac. 620 (1930); Thomas v. Thomas, 70
Colo. 29, 197 Pac. 243 (1921).
131 Ibid.
132 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 571 (2d ed. 1956) ; King, A Reappraisal of the Revocable Trust,
19 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 1, 3 nn,20 & 21 (1946). For a discussion of differences be-
tween gifts inter vivos and transfers in trust, see Schenkein, Widow's Right in Colo-
rado to Set Aside Husband's Inter Vivos Transfer, 26 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 180, 187
(1954).
133 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 57.1 (2d ed. 1956).
134 Denver Nat'l Bank v. Von Brecht, 137 Colo. 88, 322 P.2d 667 (1958).
135 133 Colo. 180, 292 P.2d 977 (1956).
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In Denver Nat'l Bank v. Von Brecht3' the trust was attacked
by the settlor's wife, but the attack was on the ground that the trust
was testamentary in nature. The court held otherwise. There was
no alternative assertion by the wife that she was entitled to exercise
her statutory claim against the trust property even if it were deemed
nontestamentary."3 ' So, the question in Colorado remains open. How-
ever, the cases provide little reason to believe that the wife's rights in
the trust property will be recognized. On the contrary, they seem to
indicate that if the trust is deemed nontestamentary, it will be deemed
a valid, completed inter vivos transfer against the wife. 3
There is some authority and respected opinion that the wife
should not be precluded from asserting her rights simply because for
other purposes the trust would be valid as nontestamentary.' 9 While
no one would feel that the wife should be deprived of some right to
share in trust property over which the husband had a power of revo-
cation, with control and enjoyment during his lifetime, it can be
argued that the solution lies in legislation. That is to say, in order to
preserve the conception of a revocable living trust as a valid, non-
testamentary device, the decisions with regard to the wife's rights
should be consistent with those holding such trusts nontestamentary
in their creation and operation. When the wife's rights depend, as
they do in Colorado, on the property's being deemed a part of the
husband's probate estate, she should be precluded from reaching
trust property not in his probate estate. 4 '
It would seem a statute relating to the wife's rights in the trust
property would be appropriate. In 1947 Pennsylvania enacted the
following statute for the wife's protection:
A conveyance of assets by a person who retains a power of appoint-
ment by will, or a power of revocation or consumption over the
principal thereof, shall at the election of his surviving spouse, be
treated as a testamentary disposition so far as the surviving spouse
is concerned to the extent to which the power has been reserved,
but the right of the surviving spouse shall be subject to the rights of
136 137 Colo. 88, 322 P.2d 667 (1958).
137 See 30 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 517, 520 (1958).
138For a thorough and analytical examination of all aspects of the wife's statutory
share, see Rea, Election to Take the Statutory Share, 29 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 506
(1957).
130Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937); Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co.,
144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E.2d 381 (1944) ; 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 57.5 (2d ed. 1956)
(arguable that though the creation of a revocable trust is not so far testamentary as
to be invalid under the statute of wills, it is so far testamentary as to allow the wife
to recover a distributive share) ; Rea, Election to Take the Statutory Share, 29 ROCKY
MT. L. REV. 506, 543 (1957).
140And certainly after Denver Nat'l Bank v. Von Brecht, 137 Colo. 88, 322 P.2d 667




any income beneficiary whose interest in income becomes vested in
enjoyment prior to the death of the conveyor.
141
Such a statute would protect the wife without unnecessarily confus-
ing the clear conception of the validity of the revocable trust which
now prevails in Colorado.
III. UNFUNDED OR NOMINALLY FUNDED TRUSTS
A. Facts of Independent Significance and Incorporation by Reference
For a number of reasons the owner may not desire to place a
substantial amount of his property in the trust while living, yet does
desire to have such a trust as a receptacle to take property from his
will. He will not have the advantages which ordinarily inure to the
benefit of the settlor from the operation of the trust during his life-
time, but will have the advantages of the trust as it operates in a post-
death manner. There are two doctrines of the law of wills, incorpo-
ration by reference,142 and facts of independent significance," which
are applicable to pouring over property from a will into a previously
created inter vivos trust.
Without doubt, if the testator spelled out in his will the terms
of the inter vivos trust, he would have created a valid trust - a testa-
mentary trust."' The testator would not have given property to the
inter vivos trust, but simply would have created a testamentary
trust, identical in terms to the previously created living trust. The
continuing supervision of the trust would be in the court having pro-
bate jurisdiction.'
However, if the testator attempts to devise or bequeath property
to a previously created trust, a different problem arises. The objec-
tion to such a disposition is that the trust, which is not an instrument
executed in accordance with the statute of wills, is going to control
the ultimate disposition of the property which it receives. It appears
to be a disposition of property owned at death not made in accord-
ance with the requirements of the statute of wills. It is at this point
that the theories of incorporation by reference and facts of independ-
ent significance come into play.
If the testator, in lieu of repeating the terms of the living trust
141 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.11 (Purdon 1950). The conveyance is to be treated
'as" testamentary for this one purpose; it is not made testamentary. It also protects
persons who start to receive income before the settlor's death. This seems entirely
proper, since the wife should share only in that property which her husband enjoyed
throughout his life, and not in that property others were enjoying. See Joint State
Late Commission Comment, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.11 (Purdon 1950).
1
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ATKINSON, WILLS § 80 (2d ed. 1953).
143 Id. § 81.
144 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 54.3 (2d ed. 1956).
145 CoLo. REV. STAT. § 152-14-11(3) (1953).
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in the will, simply refers to the trust previously created as an existing
instrument, adequately identifying it by reference, for example to its
title or date of creation, the trust instrument... will be deemed to
have been incorporated into the will. However, since this is tanta-
mount to having repeated the terms of the trust in the will, the trust
is testamentary in nature, subject to court control and supervision.
4 7
Serious problems arise when an attempt is made to use this
theory to validate a trust which was, in accordance with its terms,
amended after the execution of the will. If the trust instrument were
amended after the execution of the will, when the will became opera-
tive upon the settlor's death, the trust instrument which it purported
to incorporate would no longer exist. If the will were deemed to in-
corporate the trust as amended, the testator would have, in effect,
amended his will other than by codicil in statutory form,' which
amendment is invalid.' This conceptual problem has caused some
courts to hold the amended trust was not incorporated into the will."'
Of course, if the settlor amended the trust after the execution of his
will, but then executed a codicil to his will, which referred to the
trust as amended, as an existing instrument, the incorporation of the
amended trust would be valid."'
The theory of facts of independent significance has not been
circumscribed by the rigid conceptualistic tenets of the theory of in-
corporation by reference. "Even though a disposition cannot be fully
ascertained from the terms of the will, it is not invalid if it can be
ascertained from facts which have significance apart from their effect
upon the disposition in the will.""' This doctrine of wills was de-
signed to make valid gifts to classes of persons, or to persons by de-
scription, where extrinsic evidence was necessary to determine the
members of the class or the person described. Since it requires facts
which have significance apart from their effect on this determination,
there is not the danger ordinarily present when reference is made to
documents outside the will which are not executed in compliance
with the statute of wills.
146 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 54.3 (2d ed. 1956) (trust instrument and not the trust which is
incorporated by reference).
147 Id. § 54.1 (doctrine of incorporation by reference not recognized in many states).
No cases were found in Colorado which dealt with the theory.
14
8
COLO. REV. STAT. § 153-5-2 (1963) (requisites for a will). COLO. REv. STAT.
§ 153-1-1(15) (1963), provides that when the word "will" is used in Chapter 153
of the Colorado Revised Statutes, it shall include a codicil.
149 Freeman v. Hart, 61 Colo. 455, 158 Pac. 305 (1916).
50 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Cleveland, 291 Mass. 380, 196 N.E. 920 (1935) ; President
and Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz, 260 App. Div. 174, 21 N.Y.S.2d 232
(1940).
151 The same would be true if the trust were amended by a writing executed in accord-
ance with the statute of wills. See Stouse v. First Nat'l Bank, 312 Ky. 405, 245
S.W.2d 914 (1951) ; 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 54.3 (2d ed. 1956).
152 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 54.2 (2d ed. 1956).
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Perhaps two examples will serve to illustrate the doctrine and
the distinction it makes. If the testator left property "to those persons
whose names appear in a letter which will be found with my effects
at my death," it is clear that the letter, and the names of the persons
therein, have no significance except as they determine who shall take
property under the will."53 Thus, this disposition would be invalid
for failure to comply with the statute of wills. However, if the testa-
tor left property "to those persons in my employ at my death," then
this description, and the persons who bear such relationship to the
testator at his death, will have significance apart from the effect
upon the disposition because they would still be the persons in his
employ at his death whether or not the will had been made.5 4 While
each disposition would, in effect, allow the testator to change his
will (in the former, by changes in the letter after execution of the
will, and in the latter by selective hiring and retention of employees),
the possibility of fraud, which the statute of wills is designed to
avoid,'55 is not as likely in the latter case.
When the theory of independent significance is applied to the
problem of pouring over property to a revocable living trust, it is
more helpful in avoiding the conceptualistic difficulties of incorpo-
ration by reference when the trust is amended after the execution of
the will. The trust, even as amended, can be said to have indepen-
dent significance as it exists at the time of the testator's death, apart
from its effect on the ultimate disposition of the property passing
under the will. 5 '
A problem arises when employing this theory if the trust is only
nominally funded during the settlor's lifetime. Can it be said the
trust has independent significance if its nominal funding was only to
create a receptacle for property to be poured over from the will?
Professor Scott thinks it cannot.'57 When this theory is employed,
how many trusts are created, one or two? Will the inter vivos trust
be treated as testamentary or inter vivos after the pour-over? Pro-
fessor Scott feels that only one trust is created, and that it remains
inter vivos in nature.'58 There is some authority to this effect. 9
1s3 Id. § 54.
154 Id. § 54.2.
15
5 Id. § 57.2.
156 Id. § 54.3.
157 Ibid.
158 Ibid.
159 Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 1, 193 P.2d 721
(1948), noted in 22 So. CAL. L. REV. 205 (1949); In State ex rel. Citizens Bank
v. Superior Court, 236 Ind. 135, 138 N.E.2d 900 (1956); In re Estate of York,
95 N.H. 435, 65 A.2d 282 (1949).
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Colorado has solved the problems raised by these two theories with
regard to pour-overs, by statute providing:
(1) By a will, a testator may devise or bequeath property to a trus-
tee of a trust which is evidenced by a written instrument in existence
when the will is made and which is identified in the will, even
though the trust is subject to amendment, modification, revocation
or termination, and irrespective of the value of the corpus of the
trust. Unless the will provides otherwise, the property so be-
leathed or devised shall be treated as an addition to the trust and
sall be governed by the terms and provisions of the instrument
creating the trust, including any amendments or modifications in
writing made at any time before or after the making of the will
and before the death of the testator, and upon proper delivery of the
property so devised and bequeathed to the trustee as such, the
property so devised or bequeathed shall be no longer subject to
the jurisdiction of the county court. No reference to any such trust
in any will shall cause the assets held under the provisions of such
trust instrument at the time of the death of the testator to be in-
cluded in the property administered as part of the testator's estate.16
This statute solves the problem under the theory of incorporation by
reference concerning the subsequent amendment of the trust after
the execution of the will. It eliminates the question raised under the
theory of facts of independent significance about the value of the
trust assets which must be present to make the trust of more than
nominal significance. It eliminates any doubt about the jurisdiction
of the court after the property passing under the will is paid over to
the trustee; it solves the problem of whether the living trust becomes
testamentary when a pour-over is made; and it expressly keeps assets
already in the trust at the testator's death from having to go through
the process of probate.16'
B. Insurance Trusts
Another increasingly common type of unfunded inter vivos trust
is the life insurance trust.'62 It is like the ordinary inter vivos trust
except that the trustee has no duties to perform and there is no prop-
erty to be managed until the death of the insured.'63 As noted earlier,
life insurance has been held to be nontestamentary in nature as have
life insurance trusts. 6 " The theory of validity is that the trustee, as
160 CoLo. REV. STAT. § 153-5-44 (1963). COLO. REV. STAT. § 153-16-3 (1963) con-
tains similar provisions for property bequeathed or devised to a charitable trust.
161 See generally Kemp, Recent Colorado Legislation Greatly Enhances the Utility of
Testamentary and Inter Vivos Life Insurance Trusts, 32 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 382,
386, for a discussion of possible problems of construction which might be raised in
future litigation.
162 VANCE, INSURANCE § 119 (3d ed. 1951); 50 HARV. L. REV. 511 (1937).
163 Hawley, The Use of Life Insurance in Planning Small Estates, 25 ROCKY MT. L.
REV. 149, 160 '(1953).
164 Sigal v. Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 119 Conn. 570, 177 Atl. 742 (1935);
In re Albert Anderson Life Ins. Trust, 67 S.D. 393, 293 N.W. 527 (1940); 46
HARV. L. REV. 818 (1933).
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beneficiary of the policy, immediately becomes the trustee of his in-
terest as beneficiary. He may be designated in the beneficiary pro-
visions of the policy as trustee, or he may be a beneficiary who agrees
with the insured to hold his interests in trust."5
If the insured has no right to change the beneficiary, there is no
question but that the trust is not testamentary, since the trustee has
indefeasibly vested rights as beneficiary of the policy. 66 Where the
insured does have a right to change the beneficiary of the policy, the
minority view follows the theory which supports revocable trusts;
that is, the beneficiary has a vested right, even though subject to be-
ing divested, which he holds in trust.'67 While a majority of juris-
dictions adopt the view that the beneficiary of the policy has a mere
expectancy interest which will ripen into a property right only upon
the insured's death without his having changed the beneficiary, this
expectancy interest is consistently, nevertheless, found to be a suffi-
cient right to constitute the res of a valid inter vivos trust. 8
Insurance trusts are valid in Colorado,'69 even if there is a right
to change the beneficiary of the policy or to revoke the trust.76 Colo-
rado has passed legislation designed to enhance and facilitate the
creation of insurance trusts (and trusts of proceeds payable under
other contractual arrangements), providing that the owner of the
policy may designate as beneficiary of the policy a trustee named in
any inter vivos or testamentary trust existing at the time of such
designation. 7' The statute provides that it is not necessary to the
validity of such a trust that there be any trust corpus other than the
right to receive the designated benefits. Provision is also made for
the designation as beneficiary of a trustee who is named or who is to
be named in, or ascertainable under, the will of the person making
the designation.7 It also provides that the terms of the trust agree-
ment shall control the extent to which the proceeds of the insurance
shall be subject to the debts of the insured if paid to such a trustee.
1 3
165 1 ScoTr, TRUSTS § 57.3 (2d ed. 1956).
166 VANCE, INSURANCE § 106 (3d ed. 1951); Vance, The Beneficiary's Interest in a
Life Insurance Policy, 31 YALE L.J. 343, 344 (1922).
167Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Woolf, 138 N.J. Eq. 450, 47 A.2d 340 (1946) ; Fidel-
ity Title and Trust Co. v. Graham, 262 Pa. 273, 105 At. 295 (1918); VANCE, IN-
SURANCE § 108 (3d ed. 1951).
168 Grimm v. Grimm, 26 Cal. 2d 173, 157 P.2d 841 (1945) ; Gordon v. Portland Trust
Bank, 201 Ore. 648, 271 P.2d 653 (1954) ; VANCE, INSURANCE § 108 (3d ed.
1951).
169 Bosma v. Evans, 96 Colo. 504, 44 P.2d 511 (1935) ; Fee v. Wells, 65 Colo. 348,
176 Pac. 829 (1918).
170 Brown v. International Trust Co., 130 Colo. 543, 278 P.2d 581 (1954).
171 COLO. REV. STAT. § 153-19-1 (1963), as amended, Colo. Sess. Laws 1964, ch. 39,
§ 437, at 378.
172 Ibid.
1'3 COLO. REV. STAT. § 153-19-1(7) (1963).
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Thus, even the man of modest means may arrange a trust during
his lifetime for what may be the largest asset he leaves without its
being testamentary in nature and unfettered by the claims of his
creditors.
IV. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
A. The Rule Against Perpetuities
The rule against perpetuities is in effect in all states as the com-
mon law rule except as modified by statute.17 The rule was made
applicable in Colorado by a statute adopting the common law of
England.' Professor Gray states the rule: "No interest is good un-
less it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some
life in being at the creation of the interest.'' I  The Colorado court,
in some earlier cases, seemed to graft onto the common law rule the
provision that the gestation period is allowed as an automatic exten-
sion of the gross period of the rule.'77 However, it would seem that
this unwarranted modification was unintentional, and that Colorado
follows the rule as stated by Professor Gray.178
The rule is applicable to equitable interests as well as legal in-
terests.'79 Therefore, the drafter of the inter vivos trust must always
keep it in mind when drafting the dispositive provisions of the trust.
Colorado applies what has been called "Gray's remorseless construc-
tion"'80 by ascertaining first whether the interest under consideration
is vested or contingent; and, if contingent, the rule is then applied
"remorselessly."'
There is a special question with regard to revocable trusts;
namely, when does the rule begin to run? Does it commence to
measure the period from the date of the creation of the trust, or, on
the other hand, from the date of the death of the settlor, when his
power to revoke ceases? The policy underlying the rule is to prohibit
174 GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 200 (4th ed. 1942).
175 COLO. REV. STAT. § 135-1-1 (1963).
176 GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (4th ed. 1942).
177 In re Tritch's Will, 1 Colo. (Nisi Prius) Dec. 42, 44 (1900) ; Chilcott v. Hart, 23
Colo. 40, 59, 45 Pac. 391, 398 (1896).
178 Gray's definition was noted with approval in Miller v. Weston, 67 Colo. 534, 539,
189 Pac. 610, 612 (1920). Though after Miller there was again mention of the
fraction period in Gregory v. Colorado Nat'l Bank, 91 Colo. 172, 175, 13 P.2d 273,
274 (1932), it was only "in cases of posthumous birth" and not as an automatic
extension. Dean King felt the courts always meant only to state the common law
rule which permits the inclusion of actual periods of gestation. KING, FUTURE IN-
TERESTS IN COLORADO 109 (1950).
179 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 62.10 (2d ed. 1956).
180 GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 629 (4th ed. 1942) ("[Elvery provi-
sion in a will or settlement is to be construed as if the Rule did not exist, and then
to the provision so construed the Rule is to be remorselessly applied.").
181 Colorado Nat'l Bank v. McCabe, 143 Colo. 21, 29, 353 P.2d 385, 389 (1960), noted
in 33 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 252 (1961).
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the creation of contingent future interests with remote vesting which
would fetter the marketability of property for too long a period. 8'
Professor Scott is of the opinion that the policy of the rule is not
violated if the rule begins to run only at the settlor's death; 83 other
authorities,' and what is apparently the sole case on the point take
the same position.'8 '
Since the revocable inter vivos trust serves as a dispositive in-
strument, the drafter must keep the rule in mind. Once the problem
of when the rule begins to run has been determined from the nature
of the instrument, the rule's application under the revocable trust
will be the same as under any other dispositive instrument.8 '
B. Manner of Revocation
A trust is not revocable unless the power to revoke is expressly
reserved in the trust instrument.'87 While it is clear that the trust is
valid if such a power is reserved, the question of the effective method
of revocation remains. It would seem to be insufficient simply to
manifest an intention to revoke. Rather, the trust may be revoked
only in the manner specified in the trust instrument. 8
C. The Statute of Frauds
By statute in Colorado any trust "concerning lands, or in any
manner relating thereto" must be created by an instrument in writing
in order to be valid. 88 Of course, a trust prepared by an attorney
would invariably be evidenced by a formal trust instrument whether
or not any interest relating to land were involved. Partial perform-
ance will take an oral trust from the operation of the statute. "
With regard to assignments of interests in trusts, Colorado pro-
vides by statute that any assignment or grant of any existing trusts
"in lands, goods or things in action" shall be void unless in writing.'
182 Barry v. Newton, 130 Colo. 106, 114-15, 273 P.2d 735, 740 (1954) ; GRAy, THE
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 2 (4th ed. 1942).
183 1 Scorr, TRUSTS § 62.10(1) (2d ed. 1956).
1'4 GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 524.1 '(4th ed. 1942); Leach, Perpetui-
ties in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REv. 638, 662 (1938).
185 Manufacturers Life Ins. Co. v. Von Hamm-Young Co., 34 Hawaii 288 (1937),
noted in 51 HARv. L. REV. 172 (1938).
186 For a discussion of Colorado cases, see KING, FUTURE INTERESTS IN COLORADO,
Ch. 7 (1950).
187 Smith v. Simons, 99 Colo. 227, 230, 61 P.2d 589, 590 (1936).
188 Brown v. International Trust Co., 130 Colo. 543, 546, 278 P.2d 581, 583 (1954)
(where trust instrument provided for revocation by writing delivered to trustees in
the settlor's lifetime, revocation could not be by will).
189 COLO. REV. STAT. § 59-1-6 (1963) ; Kennedy v. Bates, 142 Fed. 5 (1905) ; Grif-
fid v. Sands, 84 Co. 456, 271 Pac. 191 (O98) ; Agnew v. Agnew, 57 Colo. 81.
185 Pac. 259 (1919) ; Farrand v. Beoshoar, 9 Colo. 291, 12 Pac. 196 (1886).
190 Bushner v. Bushner, 134 Colo. 509, 307 P.2d 204 (1957); Vandewiele v. Vande-
wiele, 110 Colo. 556, 136 P.2d 523 (1943).
19 1 COLO. REV. STAT. § 59-1-18 (1963).
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D. Tax Aspects of the Revocable Living Trust
There are no tax advantages to be gained from the use of the
revocable trust."2 However, neither are there any tax disadvantages,
for all of the tax saving benefits given under the federal and state
revenue codes can be utilized through the use of a revocable trust, as
well as through the use of a will.193 No gift tax will be paid on the
inter vivos transfer of property to the trustee, since the gift, because
of the power of revocation, is incomplete.'94 The transfer will not suf-
fice to take the property placed in trust from the settlor's gross estate
for federal estate tax purposes because of the aspect of revocability. 9 '
If the settlor reserves the income from the trust for life, he will of
course be taxed on the income received.'96 With regard to the Colo-
rado Inheritance Tax, it is provided that where there is a power in a
deed of trust to revoke the trust the property in the trust at the set-
tlor's death is taxable to the settlor's estate to the extent of the un-
exercised power to revoke. 9 '
V. ADVANTAGES OF THE REVOCABLE INTER Vivos TRUST
There are a number of advantages of the revocable inter vivos
trust. A settlor may retain control and enjoyment of his property
for life, with the advantages of professional management, knowing
he has created a dispositive scheme which will continue to operate
without interruption upon his death.'98 The settlor may "keep his
hand in" by the retained powers, even serving as a trustee.199 The
settlor has the opportunity to see the trust, and the trustees, in op-
eration; hence it allows him to see how his post-death arrangement
for the administration of his estate will operate."' A will can never
afford this chance. Because of the lack of formalities in the creation
of a trust,2"' it is less likely to invite attack by heirs of the settlor. °'
The revocable trust is a good arrangement to provide in advance for
192 Casner, Avoidance of Probate, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 108, 112-13 (1960) ("Thus the
use . . . of an arrangement to avoid probate when . .. [the owner] retains control
until his death must find its attractions in reasons other than avoidance during ...
[the owner's] lifetime of federal income taxes and avoidance on his death of federal
estate taxes." ).
193 Meyer, Non-Tax Advantages of the Revocable Trust, 37 DICTA 333, 341 (1960).
1
94
Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(c) (1958).
195 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2036, 2038.
196 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 676-77.
197 COLO. REv. STAT. § 138-3-10 (1963).
198 SHATTUCK & FARR, AN ESTATE PLANNER'S HANDBOOK 85 (2d ed. 1953); Meyer,
Non-Tax Advantages of the Revocable Trust, 37 DICTA 333 (1960).
19 1 ScoTr, TRUSTS § 57.6 (2d ed. 1956); Meyer, Non-Tax Advantages of the Re-
vocable Trust, 37 DICTA 333, 342 (1960).
200 King, Trusts as Substitutes for Wills, 14 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 1, 5 (1941).
201 id. at 4-5.
202 Meyer, Non-Tax Advantages of the Revocable Trust, 37 DICTA 333, 334-35 (1960).
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the possible incapacity of the settlor, avoiding the concommitant ne-
cessity for a conservatorship.2 It provides a means, as any trust, of
protecting the beneficiaries from their own indiscretion, and in the
case of minors may eliminate the necessity for the appointment of a
guardian.'
Perhaps the most notable advantage of the revocable trust is the
avoidance of probate for the property constituting the res of the
trust. By avoiding probate the estate is saved executor's fees, the
executor's attorney's fees and court costs,2" all of which run between
five and ten per cent of the value of the probate estate in Colorado.0 8
The publicity incident to probate is also avoided since the trust is not
a matter of public record as is the will and its attendant probate
papers."7 The delay of probate is also absent. 8
If the trust encompasses business enterprises of the settlor, they
may continue to operate under the guidance of the trustees without
interruption upon the settlor's death. This result cannot be obtained
by the use of a will, since an executor's duty is to act as a short-term
fiduciary, winding up the operation of businesses and closing the
estate.2"
It has been asserted that advantage also stems from the subjec-
tive practice of attorneys to make wills stereotyped in practice and to
use greater imagination and ingenuity in the drafting of trusts.210
An important advantage is that inter vivos trusts are not subject
to court accounting and control procedures. 21' This is true even if the
203 SHATTUCK & FARR, AN ESTATE PLANNER'S HANDBOOK 86, 87 (2d ed. 1953).
2o4 Id. at 189.
205 While there may be transfer taxes on stock placed in trust (Internal Revenue Code
Section 4321), they would not be substantial enough to offset the gain achieved by
avoiding probate. Casner, Estate Planning -Avoidance of Probate, 60 COLUM. L.
REv. 108, 114 (1960).
206Meyer, Non-Tax Advantages of the Revocable Trust, 37 DICTA 333, 336 (1960);
Rea, Election to Take the Statutory Share, 29 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 506, 541 n.201
(1957).
207 Though a copy of the trust must be filed in tax offices, they are not open to public
scrutiny as are probate files. Meyer, Non.Tax Advantages of the Revocable Trust,
37 DICTA 333, 336 (1960). Of course, there may be those to whom publicity con-
cerning their financial affairs following death is unimportant, but who are extremely
reluctant to divulge information to attorneys or trustees while alive.
208King, Trusts as Substitutes for Wills, 14 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 1, 4 (1941).
209 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 6 (2d ed. 1956):Although an executor might continue a busi-
ness for a short while, he could not do so for the length of time or with the facility
of a trustee. In Calkins, Administration of Testate Estates, 29 ROCKY MT. L. REV.
557, 564-65 (1957), it was stated that "if the decedent was engaged in a business
. . . a court order authorizing its continuance should be obtained. The right to con-
tinue the business, however, is limited to a 'reasonable time,' in order to provide for
efficient liquidation (Colorado Revised Statute section 153-10-34 (1963)]. This
would seem to require the disposal of the business by the executor, unless the will
gives him power to continue and distribute it on closing the estate."
210 SHATTUCK & FARR, AN ESTATE PLANNER'S HANDBOOK 89 '(2d ed. 1953).
211 Id. at 195.
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trust receives a pour-over increment from the will of the settlor. 12
Testamentary trusts are subject, however, to court control with annual
accounting requirements, unless it appears to the court that it was
not the intention of the testator that the court should not continue
the administration of the estate.13
At least with regard to personal property, the law of inter vivos
trusts can be the law of the most liberal jurisdiction with regard to
such trusts, if desired by the settlor, for it has been held that the law
of the situs of the trust property controls the validity and operation
of the trust, and not the law of the settlor's domicile. 14 While at
present Colorado seems among the most liberal of jurisdictions with
regard to the validity of revocable trusts, this factor could be of im-
portance if the position were reversed.
CONCLUSION
The Von Brecht"r case unreservedly carries the Colorado court's
imprimatur of validity for a trust created by a formal trust instru-
ment which reserves a life estate to the settlor and a power to revoke
or amend the trust. The opinion acknowledges that the trust may re-
tain its inter vivos nature if the settlor also reserves "additional
powers if he does not go too far." It specifically held that the reser-
vation by the settlor of the "additional power" to veto investments
proposed by the trustee when the amount involved was in excess of
$1,000 "did not go too far."
It is impossible to say what "additional powers" the court had in
mind when it appended its warning. Indeed the cautionary phrase
may indicate simply a feeling that somehow a settlor might retain so
much control the trust would be testamentary in nature.
Concerning "additional powers" which relate to the settlor's
control over investments, clearly no meaningful distinction can be
made between the control by the settlor over investments involving
in excess of $1,000 which existed in Von Brecht, and control over all
investments regardless of value. Similarly, no meaningful distinction
can be made to depend upon whether the settlor merely has a veto
power over investment decisions proposed by the trustees as in Von
Brecht, or whether, on the other hand, investment initiatives must
come from the settlor, and then be executed by the trustee. Thus,
projecting from the Von Brecht case, in Colorado a settlor should be
able to retain complete control over all investment decisions, in addi-
2 12 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 153-5-44 (1963).
2 13 
COLo. Rav. STAT. § 153-14-11(3) (1963), as amended, Colo. Sess. Laws 1964, ch.
39, § 432 at 378.
214 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), noted in 72 HARV. L. REv. 695 (1959).
215 Denver Nat'l Bank v. Von Brecht, 137 Colo. 88, 322 P.2d 667 (1958).
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tion to his life estate and the power to revoke and amend, without
destroying the nontestamentary nature of the trust.
One can imagine a trust which would allow the settlor to retain
possession of the trust assets, although legal title has been trans-
ferred to another as trustee. The beneficiaries other than the settlor
would, of course, have received at the creation of the trust presently
vested interests despite the retained power to revoke. Possession by
the settlor is not in derogation of their equitable title. Indeed, pos-
session may represent nothing more than the only effective way the
settlor may enjoy a retained life estate, for example, if the trust con-
tains a home, paintings, furniture or similar types of property. Surely
then, retained possession is not the reservation by which the settlor
might "go too far."
In order to describe the outer limits of the degree of control
that may be retained, assume the revocable instrument provides that
the trustee shall hold title to the trust property for the settlor for life
with provisions for disposition after his death to others, and also
provides that the settlor shall retain possession of the trust assets,
keep the trust records, and make all decisions, both discretionary and
ministerial, concerning the operation of the trust. The trust, how-
ever, is "active" in the sense it will not be executed by the statute of
uses, because the trustee will be required to participate by signing
deeds and other title documents, insurance applications, and similar
papers requiring the assent of the holder of the legal title to the trust
assets. Tie settlor has presently conveyed defeasible equitable inter-
ests to the beneficiaries of the trust. There has been an inter vivos
transaction. The reserved control over the trust assets is not in dero-
gation of that present legal title.
Clearly a settlor may create a revocable trust by self-declaration
of trust, as well as by transfer of property to a third person as trus-
tee. The settlor would, as trustee, have complete dominion over the
trust assets. He could also retain a life estate. One may be both the
trustee and a beneficiary of a trust. So long as beneficial interests
exist in others no merger of legal and equitable title takes place."'
True, the settlor holds dominion in a fiduciary capacity in such a
situation. He must exercise his powers as trustee in compliance
with his fiduciary duties. However it would seem that the settlor
who creates a trust by transfer to a third person, but who retains vir-
tually complete control over and possession of the trust assets, might
be held to a fiduciary standard also. One who knowingly participates
in a breach of trust, even though not himself a trustee, is liable to the
beneficiaries of the trust.217
216 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 99.1 (2d ed. 1956).
217 3 id. § 326.5.
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The requirements of the statute of wills are designed to guaran-
tee that the proferred document is in truth the will of the decedent.
The fraud which the statute is designed to prevent is the offering of
a document which is, either in whole or in part, not the will of the
testator.
In any situation involving an inter vivos trust, there is the chance
the document signed by the settlor will be changed after his death,
and an altered or totally new document substituted. The extensive
safeguards of the statute of wills would not be available to deter or
assist in the discovery of such a fraud. The point is, however, that
the likelihood of such a fraud is no greater where the settlor has re-
served extensive control over the administration of the trust than
where he has not. Indeed, it is no greater than that which exists
where the trust is irrevocable and the settlor has no control over the
administration of the trust or over the trust assets.
If the owner of property simply gives possession of it to another,
with directions as to its disposition at his death if the latter still holds
it at that time, the relationship of principal and agent exists. The
agency terminates automatically at the death of either the principal
(owner) or the agent (possessor).18 No property interests were in-
tended to pass to those covered by the post-death dispositive scheme
until after the owner's death. The attempted post-mortem disposition
is clearly testamentary in nature and invalid for failure to comply
with the statute of wills. Professor Scott says that "[i]t would seem
that the legal title is in his agent."' 9 This may be true if the owner
transfers legal title to an agent simply in order that the agent might
carry out the purposes of the agency, for example, a sale. In such a
situation the owner is not conveying equitable title to others. Indeed,
he may be retaining it himself. However, if the owner conveys legal
title to another whom he designates as his "agent," but it is made
clear that the "agent" is only to have naked legal title to the property
and is to hold such title for other designated persons, a trust has been
created. Present equitable property interests have been created in
the "other designated persons." If such is the intent, of course, it
makes no difference that the transferee has been denominated an
"agent" rather than a "trustee." The intention of the transferor is to
convey presently an equitable interest in the transferred property to
the designated beneficiaries and he has taken the accepted steps to
accomplish his purpose. A distinction exists, which should be recog-
nized, between a true agency with mere possession, and an "agency"
218 1 id. § 57.2; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY §§ 120-21 (1958).
219 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 57.2, at 450 (2d ed. 1956).
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with legal title in the "agent" and equitable title in other designated
persons. The latter are beneficiaries of a valid inter vivos trust.
Thus, it can be argued that the conceptual basis for supporting
revocable inter vivos trusts should be sufficient to support any inter
vivos disposition of legal title, or any self-declaration of trust, where
it appears the settlor intended to create thereby, present interests in
those beneficiaries designated to take following his death. Retained
possession of or control over the trust property, whether or not in a
fiduciary capacity, is not inconsistent with the concept that there are
present interests in the beneficiaries other than the settlor.
It is unlikely this analysis of the theoretical support for the va-
lidity of revocable inter vivos trusts will cause attorneys to be so bold
as to advise their clients they may create a trust by conveying legal
title to a trustee, keeping the trustee available only to sign deeds, in-
surance and other papers. Nevertheless, it seems that logic and pres-
ently existing legal doctrines could support the valid inter vivos na-
ture of such a trust.
Clearly Colorado attorneys may offer their clients the prospect
of a revocable trust, with a reserved life estate and virtual control
over investments, as a will substitute. It will provide a flexible estate
planning device, achieving living and post-death objectives desired
by the settlor. Currently, problems would persist concerning marital
rights of a surviving spouse and the rights of decedent's creditors. If
the legislature continues to favor the protection of a spouse's and a
creditor's claim to a decedent's "property," legislation should be
enacted for the protection of both. Technical distinctions concerning
what assets constitute decedent's "property" available for the surviv-
ing spouse and creditors, which are sufficient to obviate the necessity
of complying with the statute of wills, are not potent enough to war-
rant thwarting these social policies.
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